Algorithmic mechanism design

Results: 48



#Item
11Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138

Strategyproof Computing: Systems Infrastructures for Self-Interested Parties Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138

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Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-11-30 14:32:02
12Algorithmic Game Theory  Summer 2015, Week 11 Non-Truthful Mechanisms Beyond the Worst-Case Or: How Google Got So Incredibly Rich

Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 11 Non-Truthful Mechanisms Beyond the Worst-Case Or: How Google Got So Incredibly Rich

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Source URL: www.cadmo.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2016-01-25 09:13:39
13CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #2: Mechanism Design Basics∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 25,

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #2: Mechanism Design Basics∗ Tim Roughgarden† September 25,

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Source URL: theory.stanford.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-12-03 15:09:27
14Algorithmic Game Theory  Summer 2015, Week 9 Truthful Multi-Parameter Mechanisms and Black-Box Reductions

Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 9 Truthful Multi-Parameter Mechanisms and Black-Box Reductions

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Source URL: www.cadmo.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2016-01-25 09:13:39
15maastricht-circle2_diapos_subregel

maastricht-circle2_diapos_subregel

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Source URL: www.games2016.nl

Language: English - Date: 2016-07-19 04:17:11
16Algorithmic Game Theory  Summer 2015, Week 5 Introduction to Mechanism Design ETH Z¨

Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 5 Introduction to Mechanism Design ETH Z¨

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Source URL: www.cadmo.ethz.ch

Language: English - Date: 2016-01-25 09:13:39
17Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing 1 Aaron Archer2 Cornell University, Operations Research Dept., Ithaca, NYE-mail:  and Joan Feigenbaum3 Arvind Krishnamurthy4 Rahul Sami

Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing 1 Aaron Archer2 Cornell University, Operations Research Dept., Ithaca, NYE-mail: and Joan Feigenbaum3 Arvind Krishnamurthy4 Rahul Sami

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Source URL: cs-www.cs.yale.edu

Language: English - Date: 2004-03-26 13:36:19
18Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138

Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138

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Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu

Language: English
19Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard∗ David C. Parkes† Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAMay 21, 2003

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard∗ David C. Parkes† Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAMay 21, 2003

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Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-11-30 14:32:04
20Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan  ∗

Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions Noam Nisan ∗

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Source URL: www.cs.huji.ac.il

Language: English - Date: 2014-01-21 11:29:27